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Abstract
In this paper, the modal logic interpretation of plausibility and belief measures on an
arbitrary universe of discourse, as proposed by Harmanec et al., is further developed by
employing notions from set-valued analysis. In a model of modal logic, a multivalued
mapping is constructed from the accessibility relation and a mapping determined by the
value assignment function. This multivalued mapping induces a plausibility measure
and a belief measure expressed in terms of conditional probabilities of inverse and su-
perinverse images, or equivalently, in terms of conditional probabilities of truth sets of
possibilitations and necessitations. Restricting to a finite universe of discourse, multi-
valued interpretations of basic probability assignments and of commonality functions
are also obtained, in terms of conditional probabilities of pure inverse and subinverse
images, or equivalently, in terms of conditional probabilities of truth sets of particular
logical expressions involving possibilitations and necessitations. Ó 1999 Elsevier Sci-
ence Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Modal logic is an extension of classical propositional logic. Its language
consists of a set of atomic propositions, logical connectives and modal oper-
ators of possibility and necessity. A standard model of modal logic is a triplet
consisting of a set of possible worlds, a binary relation on this set of worlds,
which is usually called accessibility relation, and a value assignment function,
by which, for each world, truth or falsity is assigned to each atomic proposi-
tion. Harmanec et al. [10] have developed an interpretation of plausibility and
belief measures in the framework of serial models of modal logic, in terms of
probabilities of truth sets of possibilitations and necessitations.
Dempster [8] has shown that a multivalued mapping from a universe X into
a universe Y carries a probability measure defined over subsets of X into a
system of upper and lower probabilities over subsets of Y. Shafer [15] calls
upper and lower probabilities plausibility and belief functions. Our aim in this
paper is to pursue further the modal logic interpretation of Dempster–Shafer
theory by employing notions and concepts from set-valued analysis. The at-
tractiveness of the multivalued (or set-valued) interpretation, presented in this
paper, lies in its natural analogy to the original approach of Dempster [8]. In
fact, as far as we manage to construct a multivalued mapping that establishes a
correspondence between the set of possible worlds and the set of atomic
propositions, we automatically obtain, without imposing any restrictions on
the accessibility relation, that this multivalued mapping induces a plausibility
measure and a belief measure.
2. Multivalued mappings
In this section, we recall some basic concepts from the theory of multivalued
mappings [1,3]. A multivalued mapping F from a universe X into a universe Y
associates to each element x of X a subset F x of Y. The domain of F, denoted
domF , is defined as
domF   fx j x 2 X ^ F x 6 ;g:
F is called non-void if 8x 2 X F x 6 ;; i.e. if domF   X .
Let us give an overview of the dierent direct and inverse images under a
multivalued mapping needed further on. Consider a subset A of X and a subset
B of Y.
(i) The direct image of A under F is the subset F A of Y, defined as
F A 
[
x2A
F x:
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(ii) The inverse image of B under F is the subset F ÿB of X, defined as
F ÿB  fx j x 2 X ^ F x \ B 6 ;g:
(iii) The superinverse image of B under F is the subset F B of X, defined as
F B  fx j x 2 domF  ^ F x  Bg:
(iv) The subinverse image of B under F is the subset F B of X, defined as
F B  fx j x 2 X ^ B  F xg:
(v) The pure inverse image of B under F is the subset F ÿ1B of X, defined as
F ÿ1B  fx j x 2 X ^ F x  Bg:
The above images have been studied by various people under dierent
names [1–3,6]. We adopt here the terminology used by De Baets and Kerre [6].
Note that not all authors take into account the necessary restriction of the
superinverse image to the domain of the multivalued mapping (see e.g. the
approach of Bandler and Kohout [2] criticised in Ref. [6]). The pure inverse
image can for instance be found in Ref. [16].
One easily verifies that the inverse images of the empty set and of the uni-
verse Y are given by:
(i) F ÿ;  F ;  ;, F ;  X and F ÿ1;  co domF ;
(ii) F ÿY   F Y   domF .
The following relationships hold among the dierent inverse images:
(i) the inclusion F B  F ÿB;
(ii) the complementation properties
coF ÿB  F coB [ co domF 
coF B  F ÿcoB [ co domF ; 1
obviously, if F is non-void then
coF ÿB  F coB; 2
(iii) the relationships
F B 
X if B  ;;T
x2B
F ÿfxg otherwise;
(
3
and
F ÿ1B  co domF  if B  ;;
co F ÿco B \ F B otherwise:

4
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Let us consider a second multivalued mapping G from a universe Y into a
universe Z. The composition of F and G is the multivalued mapping G  F from
X into Z defined by, for any x 2 X :
G  F x  GF x: 5
Note that if F and G are non-void then also G  F is non-void. Consider a
subset C of Z. The inverse image of C under G  F is given by:
G  F ÿC  F ÿGÿC: 6
3. Dempster–Shafer theory
The development of a mathematical theory of evidence, nowadays referred
to as Dempster–Shafer theory, was initiated by Dempster in 1967 with the
study of upper and lower probabilities [8]. Considering a probability measure P
on PX , he showed that a multivalued mapping C from X into Y induces
upper and lower probabilities on PY , as follows:
P B  P C
ÿB
P CÿY 
PB  P C
B
P CY ;
7
where CÿY   CY   domC: It is clear that P  and P are only well defined
if P domC > 0. In case of a finite universe Y, he observed that these upper
and lower probabilities are completely determined by the quantities P Cÿ1C,
C 2 PY .
Shafer reinterpreted upper and lower probabilities as degrees of plausibility
and belief, abandoning Dempster’s idea that they arise as upper and lower
bounds over classes of Bayesian probabilities [15]. The formal definitions of
plausibility and belief measures are given next:
(i) A PY  ! 0; 1 mapping Pl is called a plausibility measure on PY  if
Pl;  0, PlY   1 and
Pl
\n
i1
Ai
 !

X
If1;...;ng
I 6;
ÿ1jI j1Pl
[
i2I
Ai
 !
for any finite family Aini1 in PY .
(ii) A PY  ! 0; 1 mapping Bel is called a belief measure on PY  if
Bel;  0, BelY   1 and
160 E. Tsiporkova et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 21 (1999) 157–175
Bel
[n
i1
Ai
 !
P
X
If1;...;ng
I 6;
ÿ1jI j1Bel
\
i2I
Ai
 !
for any finite family Aini1 in PY .
Note that plausibility and belief measures come in dual pairs. For any belief
measure Bel on PY , the PY  ! 0; 1 mapping Pl defined by
PlA  1ÿ BelcoA
is a plausibility measure on PY . For instance, P  and P are dual.
Furthermore, in case of a finite universe Y, Shafer introduced the concepts
of a basic probability assignment and its focal elements and of a commonality
function [15]. Formally, they can be defined as follows [7,15]:
(i) A PY  ! 0; 1 mapping m is called a basic probability assignment on
PY  if m;  0 andX
B2PY 
mB  1:
A subset F of Y for which mF  > 0 is called a focal element of m.
(ii) A PY  ! 0; 1 mapping Q is called a commonality function on PY  if
Q;  1,X
B2PY 
ÿ1jBjQB  0
and
Q
\n
i1
Ai
 !
P
X
If1;...;ng
I 6;
ÿ1jI j1Q
[
i2I
Ai
 !
for any finite family Aini1 in PY .
There exists a one-to-one correspondence between any of the concepts belief
measure, plausibility measure, basic probability assignment and commonality
function. Given a basic probability assignment m, the corresponding belief
measure Bel and its dual plausibility measure Pl, and the corresponding
commonality function Q are given by:
BelB  P
FB
mF ;
PlB  P
F\B6;
mF ;
QB  P
BF
mF :
Conversely, given a belief measure Bel, the corresponding basic probability
assignment m is given by:
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mB 
X
CB
ÿ1jBnCjBelC;
given a commonality function Q, the corresponding basic probability assign-
ment m is given by:
mB 
X
BC
ÿ1jCnBjQC:
All other correspondences can be derived from the ones above.
Remark 3.1. It is interesting to observe that the upper and lower probabilities (7)
can be interpreted as conditional probabilities of inverse and superinverse images
given the domain of the multivalued mapping, as follows:
P B  P CÿB j domC;
PB  P CB j domC: 8
The corresponding basic probability assignment m is given by Ref. [8]:
mB  P Cÿ1B j domC: 9
Observe that, when mB > 0 it must hold that Cÿ1B 6 ; and hence
9x 2 X B  Cx:
Consequently, the focal elements are to be found in the set fCx j x 2 domCg:
Moreover, as it is shown next, also the corresponding commonality function Q
can be written in the same style, using conditional probabilities of subinverse
images, as follows:
QB  P CB j domC: 10
Indeed, one easily verifies that for any subset B of Y it holds that:
CB 
[
BC
Cÿ1C:
It then follows that
QB 
X
BC
mC 
X
BC
P Cÿ1C j domC:
Since the family Cÿ1B j B 2 PY  n f;g forms a partition of domC, we can
write X
BC
PCÿ1C j domC  P
[
BC
Cÿ1C j domC
 !
 P CB j domC:
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4. Modal logic
Modal logic is an extension of classical propositional logic and has been
developed to formalize arguments involving the notions of necessity and pos-
sibility [5]. These notions are often expressed using the idea of possible worlds:
necessary propositions are those which are true in all possible worlds, whereas
possible propositions are those which are true in at least one possible world.
Possible worlds are abstract objects and their precise meaning could be hardly
provided. Intuitively, we are to view them as possible states of aairs, situa-
tions, scenarios, etc.
The language of modal logic consists of a set of atomic propositions, logical
connectives :; ^ ; _ ;!;$, and modal operators of possibility  and necessity
. The sentences or propositions of the language are of the following form:
· atomic propositions,
· if p and q are propositions, then are so :p, p ^ q, p _ q, p ! q, p$ q, p,
p.
The interpretations of Dempster–Shafer theory that are discussed in this
paper are based on the semantics of modal logic using the concept of a stan-
dard model. A standard model of modal logic is a triplet M  hW ;R; V i, where
W denotes a set of possible worlds, R is a binary relation on W called acces-
sibility relation (we say that world v is accessible from world w when wRv), and
V is the value assignment function by which truth T or falsity F of each atomic
proposition p in each world w is assigned, i.e. V w; p 2 fT ; Pg. Since a prop-
osition may have dierent truth-values in dierent worlds, the assignment
function assigns the truth-values not to proposition constants alone, but to
pairs consisting of a possible world and a proposition constant. Therefore the
value V w; p is to be thought of as the truth-value of p in w. The value as-
signment function is inductively extended to all propositions in the usual way.
We only mention the extension to possibilitations, i.e. propositions of the type
p, and necessitations, i.e. propositions of the type p. For any proposition p
and any world w 2 W , one defines:
V w;p  T () 9v 2 W wRv ^ V v; p  T ;
V w;p  T () 8v 2 W wRv) V v; p  T :
Although it is impossible to say once for all what a model is, there always is
the common idea of a set of possible worlds and a value assignment function
[5]. Note that we will say that a proposition is true in a model just in case it is
true in each possible world in the model. Furthermore, a proposition is valid in
a class of models if and only if it is true in every model in the class.
A system of modal logic is any set of propositions closed under (contains
the conclusion whenever it contains the hypotheses) all propositionally cor-
rect modes of inference. The theorems of a system of modal logic are just the
propositions in it. A system of modal logic is sound with respect to a class of
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models of modal logic just in case every theorem of the system is valid in the
class of models, and the system is complete with respect to this class of
models if and only if every proposition valid in the class is a theorem of the
system. Thus a system of modal logic is said to be determined by a class of
models of modal logic if and only if it is sound and complete with respect to
this class.
A system determined by a class of standard models is called normal. Any
normal system contains the theorem
p $ ::p
and is closed under the rule of inference
p1 ^    ^ pn ! p
p1 ^    ^ pn ! p ; n P 0;
which expresses a general rule of modal consequence that a proposition is
necessary if it is a consequence of a collection of propositions each of which is
necessary.
The accessibility relation in a standard model expresses the fact that some
things may be possible from the standpoint of one world and impossible from
the standpoint of another. When we say that v is accessible from w, we mean
that world v is considered as possible from the perspective of world w. Im-
posing various restrictions on the accessibility relation, we obtain dierent
classes of standard models that determine dierent normal systems. For in-
stance, in a model M  hW ;R; V i, R is called serial if for all w 2 W there exists
v 2 W such that wRv and R is called reflexive if for all w 2 W it holds wRw.
Consider the following theorems:
(D) p ! p;
(T) p ! p;
(5) p ! p.
Then D is valid in M if R is serial, T  is valid in M if R is reflexive and
T  and 5 are both valid in M if R is an equivalence relation. Thus, a
standard model M  hW ;R; V i is called a D-model if R is serial and a T-
model if R is reflexive. Note also that the class of standard models with an
equivalence relation as accessibility relation determines a normal system of
modal logic known as S5 [5]. Since from here on we will only deal with
standard models and normal systems, we will omit the adjectives standard
and normal.
Let us use kpkM to denote the truth set of a proposition p, i.e. the set of all
worlds in which p is true:
kpkM  fw j w 2 W ^ V w; p  Tg:
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The structure of the truth sets of the dierent propositions is given by:
· kTkM  W and kF kM  ;;
· k:pkM  cokpkM ;
· kp ^ qkM  kpkM \ kqkM ;
· kp _ qkM  kpkM [ kqkM ;
· kp ! qkM  cokpkM [ kqkM ;
· kp $ qkM  cokpkM [ kqkMÿ  \ cokqkM [ kpkMÿ .
5. Existing approaches
In this section, we recall the modal logic interpretation of Dempster–Shafer
theory developed by Harmanec et al. [9–12]. This work is closely related to that
of Ruspini [13,14], which is based on a form of epistemic logic (equivalent in
power to the system S5), but Harmanec et al. use a more general system of
modal logic and also address the completeness of the interpretation. Ruspini’s
approach is a generalization of the method proposed by Carnap [4] for the
development of logical foundations of probability theory, and has led to new
formulas for combining dependent evidence and for utilizing conditional
knowledge.
Harmanec et al. consider a model M  hW ;R; V i and employ propositions
of the form
eA  ‘‘a given incompletely characterized element  is classified in set A’’,
where  2 X and A 2 PX . As atomic propositions, they consider the prop-
ositions efxg, for all x 2 X . The propositions eA are then defined by the equa-
tions
e; 
V
x2X
:efxg
eA 
W
x2A
efxg; 8A 2 PX  n f;g:
Furthermore, they assume that each world in the model M gives its own unique
answer to the classification question, i.e. the following holds:
Singleton Valuation Assumption (SVA): One and only one proposition efxg is
true in each world.
The latter implies that the following two theorems:
· eX
· efxg ! :
W
y 6x
efyg
are always true in M. Moreover, as a consequence eA $ :eco A is also true
in M, i.e.
keco AkM  cokeAkM :
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5.1. Finite case
In Refs. [9,11], a modal logic interpretation of Dempster–Shafer theory on
finite universes was proposed in terms of finite models, i.e. models with a finite
set of worlds. In this work, the accessibility relation R is assumed to be re-
flexive, which corresponds to M being a T-model.
Theorem 5.1 ([11]). A finite T-model M  hW ;R; V i that satisfies SVA induces a
plausibility measure PlM and a belief measure BelM on PX , defined by:
PlMA 
keAkM
 
jW j
BelMA 
keAkM
 
jW j :
Theorem 5.2 ([9]). A finite T-model M  hW ;R; V i that satisfies SVA induces a
basic probability assignment mM on PX , defined by:
mMA 
kEAkM
 
jW j ;
where
EA  eA ^
^
BA
:eB
 !
;
or equivalently,
EA  eA ^
^
x2A
efxg
 !
:
Theorem 5.3 ([9]). The modal logic interpretation of basic probability assign-
ments introduced in Theorem 5.2 is complete, i.e. for every rational-valued basic
probability assignment m on PX , there exists a finite T-model M satisfying
SVA such that mM  m:
Theorem 5.4 ([9]). A finite T-model M  hW ;R; V i that satisfies SVA induces a
commonality function QM on PX , defined by:
QMA 
kVx2A efxgkM 
jW j :
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5.2. Infinite case
In order to be able to develop a modal logic interpretation of Dempster–
Shafer theory on arbitrary universes, Harmanec et al. [10] add to a model a
probability measure on the set of possible worlds. Hence, a model of modal
logic is now meant to be a quadruplet
M  hW ;R; V ; Pi;
where W, R and V are as above, and P is a probability measure on PW .
As mentioned above, dierent systems of modal logic are characterized by
dierent additional requirements on the accessibility relation R. In Ref. [10], it
is assumed that R is serial. It is clear that the seriality of R implies its non-
voidness. Formally, this requirement corresponds to considering a D-model.
The following requirements on the value assignment function V are also
imposed:
(A) 8A;B 2 PX 28w 2 W A  B) V w; eA ! eB  T ;
(B) 8A;B 2 PX 28w 2 W A \ B  ; ) V w; eA ! :eB  T ;
(C) 8A;B 2 PX 28w 2 W V w; eA[B  T () V w; eA _ eB  T :
It is important to notice that it is not necessary to add these requirements, since
they follow from the standard way of evaluating the value assignment function.
Theorem 5.5 ([10]). A D-model M  hW ;R; V ; P i satisfying SVA and require-
ments (A)–(C) induces a plausibility measure PlM and a belief measure BelM on
PX , defined by:
PlMA  PkeAkM
BelMA  P keAkM:
The foregoing theorem expresses that PlMA can be viewed as the probability
of the set of worlds in which eA is true and that BelMA can be viewed as the
probability of the set of worlds in which eA is true.
Theorem 5.6 ([10]). The interpretation of plausibility and belief measures in-
troduced in Theorem 5.1 is complete, i.e. for every belief measure Bel (or plau-
sibility measure Pl) on PX , there exists a D-model M satisfying SVA and
requirements (A)–(C) such that Bel  BelM (or Pl  PlM ).
6. Interpretation of Dempster–Shafer theory: a set-valued approach
As we already observed in Section 3, Dempster–Shafer theory is closely
related to the theory of multivalued mappings. It is therefore our ambition to
apply the powerful apparatus of the dierent inverse images under a mul-
tivalued mapping in the development of a modal logic interpretation of
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plausibility and belief measures, basic probability assignments and com-
monality functions. We again consider a model M  hW ;R; V ; P i with P a
probability measure on PW . As atomic propositions we consider
propositions of the form efxg, for all x belonging to some universe X. Fur-
thermore, we assume that exactly one efxg is true in each world, i.e. SVA
holds.
6.1. Constructing a multivalued mapping in a model
From here on, we regard the accessibility relation R as a multivalued
mapping from W into W. This consideration is based on the observation that
every relation from a universe X into a universe Y can be characterized by
means of a mapping from X into PY . In this context, world v is accessible
from world w if and only if v 2 Rw.
The extension of the value assignment function to possibilitations and ne-
cessitations can then be rewritten as follows, for any proposition p and any
world w 2 W :
V w;p  T () 9v 2 W v 2 Rw ^ V v; p  T 
V w;p  T () 8v 2 W v 2 Rw ) V v; p  T : 11
Proposition 6.1. For any proposition p it holds that:
kpkM  RÿkpkM
kpkM  RkpkM [ co domR:
Proof. We will for instance prove the second equality. Since 8v 2 W v 2
Rw ) V v; p  T  is equivalent to Rw  kpkM , it follows with the defini-
tion of the superinverse image and Eq. (11) that
V w;p  T () w 2 RkpkM [ co domR: 
We now construct a mapping f from W into X, associating to each world
w 2 W the unique x 2 X for which V w; efxg  T . It is clear that f is non-void.
Note that for any single-valued mapping g from a universe X into a universe Y
and any subset B of Y there exists only one inverse image, i.e. gÿ1B 
gÿB  gB  fx j x 2 X ^ gx 2 Bg:
Proposition 6.2. The inverse image of any A 2 PX  under f equals keAkM , i.e.
f ÿ1A  keAkM :
168 E. Tsiporkova et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 21 (1999) 157–175
Proof. Consider a subset A of X, then the following chain of equivalences
holds:
w 2 f ÿ1A () 9x 2 Af w  x () 9x 2 AV w; efxg  T 
() V w; eA  T () w 2 keAkM : 
Let C denote the composition of R and f, i.e. C  f  R. Note that since f is
non-void, it holds that domC  domR. By Eqs. (5) and (11) we also have
that, for any w 2 W :
Cw 
[
v2Rw
f v  fx j x 2 X ^ 9v 2 RwV v; efxg  T g
 fx j x 2 X ^ V w;efxg  Tg  fx j x 2 X ^ w 2 kefxgkMg:
Proposition 6.3. The inverse and superinverse images of any A 2 PX  under C
are given by
CÿA  RÿkeAkM
CA  RkeAkM:
Proof. The first equality follows immediately from Eq. (6) and Proposition 6.2.
Using it, the second property in Eq. (1) and the fact that keco AkM  cokeAkM ,
we then easily obtain
CA  co CÿcoA [ co domC
 co Rÿkeco AkM [ co domR
 co RÿcokeAkM [ co domR  RkeAkM: 
Note that keXkM  W and keXkM  domC. The following corollary
then follows immediately from Propositions 6.1 and 6.3.
Corollary 6.1. The inverse and superinverse images of any A 2 PX  under C are
given by
CÿA  keAkM
CA  keAkM \ keXkM :
For any subset A of X, we define the proposition qA as follows:
qA 
^
x2A
efxg:
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Proposition 6.4. The subinverse image of any A 2 PX  under C is given by
CA  keXk
M if A  ;;
kqAkM otherwise:
(
Proof. Taking into account Eq. (3) and Corollary 6.1, it follows for any non-
empty subset A of X that
CA 
\
x2A
Cÿfxg 
\
x2A
kefxgkM
 k
^
x2A
efxgkM  kqAkM : 
Proposition 6.5. The pure inverse image of any A 2 PX  under C is given by
Cÿ1A  k:eXk
M if A  ;;
keA ^ qAkM otherwise:
(
Proof. Follows immediately from Eq. (4) and Corollary 6.1. Consider a non-
empty subset A of X, then
Cÿ1A  coCÿco A \ CA  cokeco AkM \ kqAkM
 k::eAkM \ kqAkM
 keAkM \ kqAkM  keA ^ qAkM : 
6.2. Plausibility and belief measures
Theorem 6.1. A model M  hW ;R; V ; P i with P domR > 0 that satisfies SVA
induces a plausibility measure PlM and a belief measure BelM on PX , defined
by:
PlMA  PkeAkM j keXkM
BelMA  P keAkM j keXkM:
Proof. Consider the multivalued mapping C from W into X constructed in the
previous section. Since P domC  PdomR > 0, we have, according to
Eq. (8), that the PX  ! 0; 1 mappings PlM and BelM defined by
PlMA  P CÿA j domC
BelMA  P CA j domC
are a plausibility measure and a belief measure on PX . Since
domC  keXkM , it follows with Corollary 6.1 that
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PlMA  P keAkM j keXkM
and
BelMA  P keAkM \ keXkM j keXkM
 P keAkM j keXkM: 
Remark 6.1. Notice that in case of a serial accessibility relation R it holds that
keXkM  keXkM  W :
The expressions in Theorem 6.1 then reduce to
PlMA  PkeAkM;
BelMA  P keAkM;
in which we clearly recognize the expressions in Theorem 5.5, showing once more
that the approach of Harmanec et al. [10] is a special case of the approach
presented here.
6.3. Basic probability assignments and commonality functions
In this section, we restrict our considerations to a finite universe X in order
to pursue a modal logic interpretation of basic probability assignments and
commonality functions.
Theorem 6.2. The basic probability assignment mM corresponding to the plau-
sibility measure PlM and belief measure BelM on PX , induced by a model M 
hW ;R; V ; P i with P domR > 0 and satisfying SVA, is given by:
mMA 
0 if A  ;;
PkeA ^ qAkM j keXkM otherwise:

Proof. From Eq. (9) it follows that the basic probability assignment mM cor-
responding to PlM and BelM is given by
mMA  P Cÿ1A j domC:
In case A  ;, we have that mMA  P co domC j domC  0: For any
non-empty subset A of X, it follows with Proposition 6.5 that
mMA  P keA ^ qAkM j keXkM: 
In a similar way, the following theorem can be shown.
Theorem 6.3. The commonality function QM corresponding to the plausibility
measure PlM and belief measure BelM on PX , induced by a model M 
hW ;R; V ; P i with P domR > 0 and satisfying SVA, is given by
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QMA 
1 if A  ;;
PkqAkM j keXkM otherwise:

Remark 6.2. It can be easily verified that in case of a finite model with a reflexive
accessibility relation and a probability measure corresponding to a uniform
probability distribution the set-valued interpretation of Dempster–Shafer theory
presented here is the same as the one in Section 5.1.
7. Example
In this section, we illustrate the simplifying eect of our set-valued approach.
We consider a set of worlds with cardinality 6, i.e. W  fw1;w2;w3;w4;w5;w6g,
and corresponding accessibility relation depicted in Fig. 1. For each world also
the element x 2 X  fa; b; c; dg is indicated for which the atomic proposition
efxg is true. As probability measure P on PW  we consider the one corre-
sponding to a uniform probability distribution, i.e. P U  jU j=6. The multi-
valued mapping C (from W into X) constructed from the model
M  hW ;R; V ; Pi is given in Table 1.
Recall that the focal elements of the basic probability assignment mM in-
duced by the model M are contained in the set
ffcg; fb; c; dg; fa; c; dgg:
Fig. 1. M  hW ;R; V ; P i:
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The calculations can therefore be kept to a strict minimum. Using the ex-
pression mMA  jCÿ1Aj=4 and the expressions of BelM , PlM and QM in terms
of mM , Table 2 can be filled in easily.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the modal logic interpretation of
Dempster–Shafer theory, developed by Harmanec et al., can be equivalently,
Table 2
The quadruplet mM ;BelM ;PlM ;QM  induced by M
A mM A BelM A PlM A QM A
; 0 0 0 1
fag 0 0 1/4 1/4
fbg 0 0 1/4 1/4
fcg 1/2 0 1 1
fdg 0 0 1/2 1/2
fa; bg 0 0 1/2 0
fa; cg 0 1/2 1 1/4
fa; dg 0 0 1/2 1/4
fb; cg 0 1/2 1 1/4
fb; dg 0 0 1/2 1/4
fc; dg 0 1/2 1 1/2
fa; b; cg 0 1/2 1 0
fa; b; dg 0 0 1/2 0
fa; c; dg 1/4 3/4 1 1/4
fb; c; dg 1/4 3/4 1 1/4
fa; b; c; dg 0 1 1 0
Table 1
The multivalued mapping C
w Cw
w1 ;
w2 fcg
w3 fb; c; dg
w4 fcg
w5 fa; c; dg
w6 ;
A Cÿ1A
fcg fw2;w4g
fb; c; dg fw3g
fa; c; dg fw5g
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and more transparantly, established using a set-valued approach, thereby
preserving the analogy to the original approach of Dempster. We are
convinced that in this way also Dempster’s rule of conditioning, and the
more general rule of combination, can be given a modal logic interpretation.
The latter interpretations are stated as open problems in Ref. [12]. First
results in this direction, based on multivalued mappings, are presented in
Ref. [17].
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